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Abstract
A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator)
dynamically compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has
the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all ur-
ban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of
demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of diﬀerent access price
regulation regimes - full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper net-
work is regulated), risk sharing - on investment incentives and social welfare.
We ﬁnd that, compared to Foros (2004), the OLO gets better access condi-
tion in case of partial regulation and exclusion does not necessarily happen in
equilibrium even if the incumbent has more ability than the OLO. Moreover,
risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and
a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.
Keywords : Investment, Regulation, Access pricing, New Technology, Risk Sharing
JEL Classiﬁcation: L51, L96
1 Introduction
Telecommunications markets are experiencing a period of drastic technological develop-
ment. The possibility to build a so-called Next Generation Network (NGN) gives ﬁrms the
chance to exploit extremely faster transmission and thereby enrich their oﬀer with more
interactive and sophisticated services. However, the actual existence and importance of a
demand for NGN applications is still uncertain1. The technology has been available for
a while now, but given the high ﬁxed costs needed to build the necessary infrastructure,
and the risks connected to it due to the uncertain demand for ultra-broadband services,
the NGN deployment goes very slowly all over the world.
The vexing issue as to how to provide ﬁrms with enough investment incentives, while
eventually reserving the beneﬁts of the network development for ﬁnal consumers, is highly
debated by industry actors, regulators and scholars. In particular, access regulation is
widely argued about its potential discouraging eﬀect on regulated ﬁrms’ investment. When
obliged to share its network elements with facilities-free rivals at a regulated access price,
the incumbent may feel reluctant to invest in NGN because of the spillover eﬀect enjoyed
by the Other Licensed Operators (OLO). For these reasons, access regulation, mainly
in the form of mandatory unbundling, may induce less or later incumbent’s investment
compared to an unregulated scenario, but also compared to the socially desired level
(Chang et al. (2003); Crandall and Singer (2003); Ingraham and Sidak (2003); Bourreau
and Dogan (2005); McFadden et al. (2005); Pindyck (2007); Grajek and Ro¨ller (2011)).
The European Commission seems to acknowledge these concerns for future investments
in NGN. In the recent Recommendation C(2010) 6223 on “Regulated Access to NGANs”
(September 2010), the possibility of relaxing - if not eliminating - ex ante regulation when
a risk sharing agreement backs up the deployment of NGN is openly considered.
The issue of broadband investment and regulation has attracted and still attracts a
lot of research attention.2 Our paper contributes to this strand of literature by addressing
the issue of access price setting when the incumbent has the option to invest in NGN
and investment returns in terms of demand increase are uncertain. Using a model where
a vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO dynamically compete in the market for
broadband access, we analyse the eﬀect of three diﬀerent access regimes on the incentives
to invest by the incumbent: full regulation (mandatory unbundling for NGN), partial
regulation (no mandatory unbundling for NGN) and risk sharing. We then compare their
1See for instance TheEconomist (2010) about lack of demand for NGN services in the US.
2Cambini and Jiang (2009) provide a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on
broadband investment and access regulation.
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impact on social welfare, balancing the eﬀect of each regulatory regime on static and
dynamic eﬃciency.
In our paper, we follow the original set-up of broadband investment and access regu-
lation developed by Foros (2004)3. We develop a model with two ﬁrms having diﬀerent
ability to oﬀer value-added services, and analyse the impact of access price regulation on
the incumbent investment’s incentive. Diﬀerently from Foros (2004), however, we adopt
a dynamic model of technology adoption and we include demand uncertainty over value-
added NGN services. Considering that NGN investment might fail to expand market
demand, we also assume that the OLO might possibly switch back to the copper network
if there is no demand for NGN applications and the access to copper is cheaper. We
then conduct our analysis comparing the impact on investment of three alternative access
regimes. In this respect, the paper closer to ours is Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011). The
authors analyse a simple two stage framework with identical ﬁrms, where the incumbent is
the only ﬁrm entitled with investment option and there is uncertainty over the investment
success in terms of demand increase. Their work compares diﬀerent modes of regulation
- access price based on costs, risk sharing and regulatory holiday - as of the extent of
investment and consumer welfare outcomes. There are several diﬀerences between our
work and Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)’s work. First, in their model, following Klumpp
and Su (2010), the access charge is determined ex-post from the equilibrium quantities,
in a way that permits a partial allocation of the ﬁxed costs borne by the incumbent. In
our model, we take a diﬀerent stand towards the case of regulated access price, in that
the regulator establishes ex-ante the level of access price, via ﬁrst-order conditions. The
benchmark case for access regulation in our model is a strict marginal cost-based rule, as
in much of the literature in this ﬁeld (Foros (2004), Kotakorpi (2006) for instance). Sec-
ond, our setting is dynamic and we investigate the timing of investment in a context with
demand uncertainty, rather than the extent of the investment. Moreover, we are able to
carry out a complete welfare analysis, whereas Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)’s work only
gives an overview of the diﬀerent modes of regulation’s implications in terms of consumer
welfare. Lastly, our model includes quality diﬀerentiation a` la Foros and considers the
its impact on the equilibrium results, while Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011)’s setting implies
undiﬀerentiated ﬁrms.
3A similar approach has been recently used by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012). In their model the
authors analyse the incumbent’s incentive to invest under regulatory non-commitment, generalizing
the results by Foros (2004). In our paper, instead, we use a dynamic investment model and demand
uncertainty and we also compare diﬀerent regulatory regimes in terms of welfare. Our analysis is
thus complementary to the Mizuno and Yoshino’s one.
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Existing literature already analyses the impact of uncertainty on the timing of telecom-
munications infrastructure development using dynamic race models between incumbent
and entrant operators and focuses on speciﬁc access pricing regimes, mainly regulatory
holidays (see, for example, Hori and Mizuno (2006), Hori and Mizuno (2009), Gans (2001),
Gans (2007)) and Vareda and Hoernig (2010)). In our model, in contrast, we consider un-
certainty in a dynamic setting but we focus on services-based competition while taking
into account diﬀerent possible regulatory regimes.
Our paper also diﬀers from a recent strand of studies that analyse the investment game
where both the incumbent and entrants have the option to invest. Brito et al. (2010b)’s
paper examines the incentives of a vertically integrated ﬁrm (regulated at wholesale level)
to invest in and to give access to a new (upgraded) wholesale technology that is not
subject to access regulation. Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2011) and Inderst and Peitz
(2011) analyse the incentives to migrate from an old technology to a new one, and how
wholesale access conditions aﬀect this migration. Finally, Manenti and Sciala` (2011) study
the impact of access regulation on entrant and incumbent’s investment and show that, in
absence of regulation, the incumbent would set an access charge to a new infrastructure
in order to prevent resale based entry and this overstimulated entrant’s investment that
might turn out to be socially ineﬃcient.
Our model reveals that the diﬀerences in ability to provide value-added services and
their absolute values with respect to the overall level of demand highly aﬀects the invest-
ment choice. Since we include the possibility for the OLO to switch back to the copper
network instead of leaving the market tout court as an alternative to the NGN, we ﬁnd
that the OLO gets better access condition in case of partial regulation and there are cases
in which, in contrast to Foros (2004), exclusion does not happen in equilibrium even if
the incumbent has more ability than the OLO. In case of mandatory switch to the NGN,
we ﬁnd that the OLO remains active in the market if and only if its ability to provide
value-added services is higher than the incumbent’s one. The equilibrium results show
that investment is always made later than the social optimum level and that uncertainty
has the eﬀect of delaying the investment even further. Due to a combination of compet-
itive intensity and investment incentives, we ﬁnd that risk sharing is the most preferable
regime from a consumer welfare perspective, but also from a total welfare perspective for
a large range of parameters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and the main ﬁndings under the three diﬀerent regulatory regimes. Section 3 summarizes
the paper and concludes.
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2 The Model
We ﬁrst present the basic features of the model. Then we present the results of partial
regulation (where only the legacy network’s access is regulated), full regulation (access to
the legacy network and NGN are both regulated) and risk sharing regimes. Finally we
illustrate welfare comparisons between the diﬀerent cases.
2.1 The Basic Framework
Two ﬁrms compete downstream for the provision of broadband connectivity. One ﬁrm
is a vertically integrated incumbent, who owns the existing infrastructure, constituted
by the copper network, and has the obligation to unbundle the network elements to its
competitor under access regulation. The access fee to the existing infrastructure is assumed
to be regulated at cost. The second ﬁrm is a downstream competitor, leasing lines from
the incumbent. Both ﬁrms provide the same services via the existing network, e.g. the
conventional PC-centric services like www and email.
The incumbent ﬁrm has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network
(NGN). Such networks allow ﬁrms for a drastic improvement of the services provided, e.g.
more speed in data transmission, enabling interactive TV-centric and gaming broadband
services, IP-based and high deﬁnition TV, more capacity and faster connectivity.
The incumbent can decide at any time whether to invest in NGN or keep on using the
copper network. Its investment choice is a one-time decision and it cannot be updated in
a later period. Once it decides to invest, the incumbent must build a network that covers
the entire market. In this paper, when we talk about the entire market, we refer to regions
that present roughly similar demand structures, in which there is uncertainty about NGN
success. The rival can then decide whether to stay with the copper network, or to ask the
incumbent for access to the NGN by paying an access fee. Alternatively, the incumbent
and the entrant can jointly undertake and share the cost of the investment under a risk
sharing agreement. In this case, we assume that each operator can use the NGN without
having to make further payments for access.
Broadband services are sold by both operators to end-users at a ﬁxed subscription
fee independent of actual usage and time connected. Hence ﬁrms face downward sloping
demand curves. Services provided by the two ﬁrms through the legacy network made
of copper are perfect substitutes. The adoption of NGN enriches the retail oﬀer with
value-added services. Market success of NGN in terms of demand increase is uncertain. If
the investment turns out to be successful, the opportunity to obtain value-added services
increases consumers’ willingness to pay and shifts demand curves upwards for both ﬁrms.
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Consumers’ quality perception of the value-added services is diﬀerentiated between the
two ﬁrms, so the respective market shares will be aﬀected. In case of failure, there is no
shift in demand.
We assume that retailers compete a` la Cournot and the quantity they sell is interpreted
as the number of subscriptions. We assume that the access to the legacy copper network is
regulated at cost and there is no regulation in the retail market. Access pricing is the only
regulatory tool in the context here, and, since the existing regulatory methods are designed
for linear access pricing, we assume a linear access price. Furthermore, in line with the
existing EU regulatory framework, we assume that access charge to the new broadband
network, in case of full regulation, has to cover at least operating (marginal) cost (i.e.
that the access charge cannot be set below cost).4 Moreover, the regulator has imperfect
ability to make credible commitment before the incumbent invests. More speciﬁcally, the
regulator is able to commit to a certain regulatory regime (full or partial regulation), but
he cannot ex-ante commit on the exact level of the access charge on NGN. Therefore it is
impossible for the regulator and the ﬁrms to contract the level of the access charge before
the NGN is deployed, though the ﬁrm knows that in case of regulation the access charge
will at least cover (marginal) cost5.
The timing of the model is as following6:
Stage 0 At any time, the incumbent ﬁrm (together with the OLO, in case of risk
sharing) decides whether to invest in building a NGN or staying with the copper network;
Stage 1 In case of full access regulation (partial access regulation), the regulator (the
incumbent ﬁrm) chooses the access price the OLO has to pay to use the NGN;
Stage 2
- At any time after the access conditions have become common knowledge, the OLO
decides whether to keep on using the legacy network or upgrade and ask access to the
NGN;
- The state of demand is revealed and the two ﬁrms compete a` la Cournot in the retail
market.
Notice that in the risk sharing case, Stage 1 and the ﬁrst bullet point of Stage 2 are
4As we will show in next paragraphs, this restriction, aside from being more realistic, is due
to the OLO’s option to switch back to the old ”copper” network. To make our analysis more
complete, we will relax this assumption in Subsection 2.2.1, imposing to the OLO a mandatory
switch to the NGN.
5Brito et al. (2010a) consider how two-part tariﬀs can mitigate the regulatory commitment
problem.
6A similar structure of the game has been adopted by Mizuno and Yoshino (2012)
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absent.
Also notice that the OLO’s decision to use the NGN appears somehow ﬂexible: it can
decide to use the NGN immediately after the investment is deployed, and before the state
of demand is realised; or it can wait and see what the true state of demand is, before decid-
ing which network to use; and, at any time, the OLO has always the option to switch back
the other (copper) network. Notwithstanding this, the regulator may decide to set access
conditions under which the OLO chooses to use the NGN after the investment is deployed
and it does not change its decision even if the investment turns out to be a failure. This
assumption is plausible for two reasons. First, given the diﬃculties in the take-oﬀ of NGN
networks, it is of greater social interest to analyse the circumstances under which more
industry actors would actually decide to initially join and stick with the NGN. Second,
in a dynamic setting, restricting our attention to such circumstances allows us to avoid
the issue of multiple equilibria (which would not however add much insights, but rather
make the model’s implications less clearcut) and makes the whole analysis more tractable
by a great extent. In an extension of the model, we will also analyse the implications of a
compulsory switch to the NGN for the OLO.
Demand Side
Consumers have unit demand. Their valuation of a ﬁrm’s service is divided into two
parts: one is for the basic broadband services and the other is for the value-added services
running on NGN. Following Foros (2004), we assume the former is heterogeneous but the
latter is homogeneous. Therefore a representative consumer’s valuation of ﬁrm i’s service
is given by: ⎧⎨
⎩v + βi with probability γ, case of successv with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Subscripts i = 1, 2 indicates incumbent and OLO, respectively. Here v is interpreted
as the consumer’s willingness to pay for the basic service without new technology and
is assumed to be uniformly distributed in (−∞, a]. Following Foros (2004), we allow for
negative values of v in order to avoid corner solutions where all consumers enter the market.
βi describes ﬁrm i’s ability to oﬀer value-added services after a successful investment and
is assumed to belong to the interval (0, g) with g = a − c > 0, where c is the marginal
cost for the provision of value-added services. Unlike Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) and
similarly to Foros (2004), ﬁrms’ abilities are diﬀerentiated. Notice also that there is no
chance here for an overall ”drastic” or ”non-drastic” investment, as in Brito et al. (2010b),
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since the market is never covered7. As in Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), market success is
uncertain: with probability γ the investment increases consumers’ willingness to pay by
βi; with probability (1 − γ), consumers’ willingness to pay does not increase at all, even
though NGN enhances the quality of services.
The subscription fee charged by ﬁrm i is pi. A representative consumer buys from ﬁrm
i other than ﬁrm j (j = 1, 2 and j = i) if the following conditions are satisﬁed:⎧⎨
⎩v + βi − pi > v + βj − pj with probability γ, case of successv − pi > v − pj with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Therefore the ﬁrms’ quality-adjusted prices P should be equal if both ﬁrms are active
in the market:⎧⎨
⎩pi − βi = pj − βj = P with probability γ, case of successpi = pj = P with probability (1− γ), case of failure
Consumers whose willingness to pay for the basic service v is no less than the quality-
adjusted price P enter the market, so there are a−P active consumers. The total quantity
provided by ﬁrms is Q = q1+q2, so we have Q = a−P . Thus the inverse demand functions
faced by ﬁrms are:
• case of success ⎧⎨
⎩p
s
1 = a+ β1 − q
s
1 − q
s
2
ps2 = a+ β2 − q
s
1 − q
s
2
• case of failure ⎧⎨
⎩p
f
1 = a− q
f
1 − q
f
2
pf2 = a− q
f
1 − q
f
2
With the superscript s, f we denote the case of investment’s success and failure, re-
spectively. Note that psi here is a quality-adjusted Cournot price, which captures ﬁrm i’s
ability to provide value-added services. Since such abilities are diﬀerentiated between the
two ﬁrms, the quality-adjusted prices diﬀer between the incumbent and the OLO, in case
of success. The demand for basic services running on the copper network, pCi is the same
as the demand in case of failure, so we have that⎧⎨
⎩p
C
1 = a− q
C
1 − q
C
2
pC2 = a− q
C
1 − q
C
2
7In Brito et al. (2010b) instead, Hotelling framework for demand implies the possibility of all
consumers preferring one ﬁrm to the other.
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Although we assume linear demand here, Foros (2004) has shown that the qualita-
tive results hold with a more general demand function Pi(Q,λi) with λi = βi as long as
∂Pi(Q,λi)/∂λi > 0 and ∂
2Pi(Q,λi)/∂λ
2
i ≤ 0.
Supply side
A local connection to an end user is composed of two main elements, namely, a local
line and a line card. The ﬁrst cost is borne by the network owner for maintaining the
daily operation of the essential input and is normalised to 0 in our model without loss
of generality. The second cost, incurred to provide services to end users at retail level,
is assumed to be constant and equal to c > 0. Further, we assume that a market for
the broadband access service exists, i.e. a > c. The access charge to the copper network
and to the NGN are denoted with rC and rl, respectively, where the superscript l = P,F
corresponds to the cases of partial regulation and full regulation, respectively. The level of
access charge is decided by the incumbent, in case of partial regulation, or by the regulator,
in case of full regulation.
We assume that the regulator sets access charges after the investment is deployed,
being aware of the presence of demand uncertainty. Hence, the access charge to the NGN
becomes rlf in case of failure and rls in case of success8.
The investment in NGN entails a quadratic adoption cost given by Ci(m,Δ) = m
2Δ2φ/2.
Δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor determined by the new-technology adoption date. Here
we use the same notation and interpretation as Bourreau and Dogan (2005) that Δ =
exp(−δt) where δ is the discount rate normalised to 1 and t denotes time. Δ reﬂects
the investment timing: a higher Δ corresponds to an earlier investment. The extent of
network updating is represented by m ∈ [0, 1]. In our setting, the incumbent chooses Δ
optimally and invests in the whole network, i.e. m = 1, so Ci(Δ) = Δ
2φ/2. φ is a positive
cost parameter. We assume the following: d
dΔC ≥ 0 and
d2
dΔ2C > 0. Notice that since the
investment cost decreases with time, there is no case in which there is no investment in
this setting, unlike in Brito et al. (2010b).
The ex-ante proﬁts of the two ﬁrms are the following:⎧⎨
⎩π
l
1 = (1−Δ)π
C
1 +Δ(γπ
ls
1 + (1− γ)π
lf
1 )
πl2 = (1−Δ)π
C
2 +Δ(γπ
ls
2 + (1− γ)π
lf
2 )
Here, ﬁrms’ proﬁts before the investment, denoted by the superscript C in the equa-
8We also solved the case where the regulator sets a single access charge for the NGN, independent
of demand. We discuss the solution of this case in footnote 12.
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tions above to represent the use of the copper network, are equal to:⎧⎨
⎩π
C
1 = (p
C
1 − c)q
C
1 + r
CqC2
πC2 = (p
C
2 − c)q
C
2 − r
CqC2
Firms’ proﬁts after investing in NGN, provided that the OLO also decides to use the
new infrastructure, are diﬀerent depending on the true state of demand.
• case of success ⎧⎨
⎩π
ls
1 = (p
ls
1 − c)q
ls
1 + r
lsqls2 − α
lΔφ/2
πls2 = (p
ls
2 − c)q
ls
2 − r
lsqls2 − (1− α
l)Δφ/2
• case of failure: ⎧⎨
⎩π
lf
1 = (p
lf
1 − c)q
lf
1 + r
lfqlf2 − α
lΔφ/2
πlf2 = (p
lf
2 − c)q
lf
2 − r
lfqlf2 − (1− α
l)Δφ/2
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] represents the way the investment’s cost is shared between
the two ﬁrms. So we have that αP = αF = 1, because in the cases of partial regulation
and full regulation the investment is undertaken by the incumbent alone, while in case of
risk sharing αRS ∈ (0, 1).
The following assumption is made for the model.
Assumption 2.1. rF ≥ 0 and rC = 0
This constraint imposes a lower bound limit to the NGN access price set by the reg-
ulator, rF , which cannot be lower than the network operation marginal cost, as in Foros
(2004). In other words, the incumbent must have a non-negative price cost margin on its
sale to the OLO if the NGN access market is regulated. In the second part of Assumption
2.1, we assume that the access fee to the copper network, rC , is regulated at marginal cost,
restricting our attention to the problem of access price setting in the NGN market. In our
model, indeed, we want to focus on those situations in which the OLO’s participation to
the NGN depends on the relative ﬁrms’ abilities in oﬀering value-added services and on
the state of demand, therefore we consider a situation in which the OLO’s outside option
is positive to start with.
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Social Welfare
The social welfare function faced by the regulator at the moment of the access fee
setting is composed of a pre-investment part and a post-investment part, with l = P,F,RS,
in the following way:
E(W ) = (1−Δ)WC +ΔE(W l)
with
WC =
(
a+ β1 − p
C
1
2
qC1 +
a+ β2 − p
C
2
2
qC2 + π
C
1 + π
C
2
)
E(W l) = γ
(
a+ β1 − p
ls
1
2
qls1 +
a+ β2 − p
ls
2
2
qls2 + π
ls
1 + π
ls
2 −Δφ/2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a+ β1 − p
lf
1
2
qlf1 +
a+ β2 − p
lf
2
2
qlf2 + π
lf
1 + π
lf
2 −Δφ/2
)
Stage 2: Retail Market Competition
Firms compete under Cournot competition in the retail market. The resulting equi-
librium quantities in this segment are:
• Before investment
qC∗1 =
a− c
3
, qC∗2 =
a− c
3
• After successful investment
qls∗1 =
a− c+ rls + 2β1 − β2
3
, qls∗2 =
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
• After unsuccessful investment
qlf∗1 =
a− c+ rlf
3
, qlf∗2 =
a− c− 2rlf
3
with l = P,F,RS denoting the diﬀerent regulatory regimes.
We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.2. 2βi ≥ βj , ∀i, j = 1, 2 with i = j
The above inequality implies that the diﬀerence in ability to provide value-added ser-
vices between ﬁrms is not too large. Therefore with any given access price rl, each ﬁrm’s
11
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quantity is a non decreasing function with respect to the investment. Under this assump-
tion, the incumbent cannot use the investment in NGN as a foreclosure tool (Foros (2004)).
Stage 2: the OLO chooses whether to use the NGN
Ex-ante, the OLO decides to ask access to NGN only if the expected proﬁts from doing
so are not lower than the proﬁts obtainable by staying with the copper network, whose
access price is regulated at cost:
E(πl2) = γπ
ls
2 + (1− γ)π
lf
2 ≥ π
C
2
with l = P,F,RS.
Once we insert the equilibrium quantities, this inequality implies that:
γ
(
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c− 2rlf
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.1)
If the above condition is satisﬁed, the OLO will switch to NGN once the incumbent’s
investment is deployed, but its success is still uncertain.
In this paper, we establish the conditions under which the OLO ﬁnds it convenient to
stay with the NGN ex-post, whatever the true state of demand turns out to be 9. The after
investment proﬁts arising when the OLO stays with copper network, or switches back to
copper network - outside option proﬁts, denoted by the superscript o - in case of success
and failure, respectively, are the following:
πos1 =
(
a− c+ 2β1
3
)2
, πos2 =
(
a− c− β1
3
)2
πof1 =
(
a− c
3
)2
, πof2 =
(
a− c
3
)2
We will only consider access conditions for which the ex-post OLO’s proﬁts from using
NGN are not lower than the outside option proﬁts:
9This restriction is required in order to be able to analyse a stable equilibrium. Otherwise, in
a dynamic context, the analysis would become much more complicated and less insightful, due to
multiplicity of potential equilibria. This hypothesis is also empirically supported by the analysis of
Alleman and Rappoport (2004) who show that the degree of substitutability between DSL services
and traditional dial-up connections is asymmetric: the cross-elasticity of dial-up services with
respect to DSL access prices is 0.423 while the cross-elasticity of DSL access services with respect
to dial-up prices is only 0.04. This means that data supports our assumption that once a consumer
switch to a new high-quality broadband service he/she is less likely to turn back to use the ”old”
one.
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• in case of success (
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
≥
(
a− c− β1
3
)2
(2.2)
• in case of failure (
a− c− 2rlf
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.3)
Following from the assumption that the copper network access price is regulated at
marginal cost level, Condition 2.3 requires that:
rlf = rC = 0 with l = P,F,RS (2.4)
By charging an access fee higher than zero in case of failure, the incumbent would
earn zero proﬁts from the upstream segment in any case, because the OLO would switch
back to the regulated copper network. Therefore, the access fee in case of failure will
respect Condition (2.4) and proﬁts will be the same as with the copper network under all
regulatory regimes:
πlf∗1 =
(
a− c
3
)2
, πlf∗2 =
(
a− c
3
)2
After substituting the expression for πlf∗2 , we can simplify the OLO’s ex-ante constraint
2.1 in the following way:(
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
≥
(
a− c
3
)2
(2.5)
As we can see, when the above condition is satisﬁed, Condition 2.2 is automatically
fulﬁlled. We will therefore consider only Conditions 2.5 and 2.4 in the rest of the analysis.
Notice that, since we are focusing on access rules which do not distort competition no
matter what the true state of demand is, Condition 2.5 does not depend on the probability
of success γ.
2.2 Partial Regulation
Stage 1: the incumbent chooses the access price to the NGN
The incumbent’s proﬁt function after investment is:
E(πP1 ) = γ((q
Ps∗
1 )
2 + rPsqPs∗2 ) + (1− γ)(q
Pf∗
1 )
2 −Δφ/2
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Remind that rPf∗ = 0, by Condition 2.4. We analyse the situation in which the incum-
bent makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the OLO, diﬀerently from Nitsche and Wiethaus
(2011) who model the partial regulation case as a Nash bargaining. Considering Condition
2.5, incumbent’s proﬁt maximisation gives three parameters range that determine diﬀerent
values for the access price chosen by the ﬁrm, as shown in Figure 1:
rPs∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10 if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3 and 6β2 < 5β1
2β2−β1
2 if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
OLO’s ability β2
0 g5β1
6
β1 +
5(a−c)
6
rPs∗ =
(
a−c
2
+ β1+4β2
10
)
(Exclusion occurs)
rPs∗ = 2β2−β1
2
rPs∗ =
(
a−c
2
+ β1+4β2
10
)
Figure 1: Partial Regulation
When β2 is higher than β1 by a considerable extent, i.e. 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3, the
OLO earns higher proﬁts in the NGN market, paying the unregulated access charge, than
in the outside option. Therefore, the incumbent charges the access price that maximises
its proﬁts and allows the greatest rent extraction from the OLO in the upstream market.
The parameter threshold 2(β2−β1)/5 ≥ (a−c)/3 derives from Condition 2.5, once inserted
the expression for the unregulated access price into the equilibrium quantities.
If 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3, the corresponding expected equilibrium quantities are the
following: ⎧⎨
⎩
E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
2 +
7β1−2β2
10
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) = γ
(
2(β2−β1)
5
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
For intermediate values of the quality parameters, the incumbent will lower the access
price to verify Condition 2.5 with equality, once considered the equilibrium quantities.
When β1 is not considerably higher than β2 - as deﬁned by the second parameter threshold
6β2 ≥ 5β1 (see Appendix A.1) -, in particular, the incumbent’s proﬁt from charging the
constrained access price to NGN is higher than the proﬁt from exclusion.
In this case, we have an intermediate parameters range such that 2(β2 − β1)/5 <
(a − c)/3 and 6β2 ≥ 5β1 (see Figure 1), that yields the following expected equilibrium
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quantities: ⎧⎨
⎩E(q
P∗
1 ) = γ
(
a−c
3 +
β1
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) =
a−c
3
Finally, when the incumbent is considerably better in oﬀering value-added services, it
prefers to exclude the OLO from the NGN market.
Hence, for 6β2 < 5β1, we obtain:⎧⎨
⎩E(q
P∗
1 ) = γ
(
a−c
3 +
2β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qP∗2 ) =
a−c
3
Notice that since the OLO’s outside option is copper network rather than leaving the
market entirely, unlike in Foros (2004), the OLO gets better wholesale access conditions. In
Foros (2004), the incumbent always charges the unconstrained access price, which excludes
the entrant whenever the entrant’s ability is not higher than the incumbent’s ability. In
this setting, for the parameters range β1 + 5(a − c)/6 > β2 > β1, the OLO is better
than the incumbent but this latter cannot charge the unconstrained access price or the
OLO will ﬁnd it more convenient to switch to the outside option. Furthermore, for the
parameters range β1 > β2 ≥ 5β1/6, the incumbent is better than the OLO in oﬀering
value-added services, but it gains more proﬁts by charging an access price that ensures
the OLO positive proﬁts in the NGN market. Only for values of the parameters such that
5β1/6 > β2 there is exclusion.
Proposition 2.1. Under the assumptions rC = 0 and 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i = j),
when the OLO has as an outside option the possibility to use the regulated copper network
rather than leaving the market entirely, there is a range of parameters for which there is
no exclusion in the provision of higher value-added services without ex ante intervention,
even if the incumbent’s ability is higher than the OLO.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Stage 0: the incumbent chooses the investment timing Δ
After inserting rPs∗, qP∗1 and q
P∗
2 into the incumbent’s proﬁt function, the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to Δ returns the following investment timings:
ΔP∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(25(a−c)2+9(10β1(a−c)+(3β1−2β2)2+4β1β2))γ
180φ if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
(3β21+2(a−c)(β1+2β2))γ
12φ if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
(4β1(a−c+β1))γ
9φ if 6β2 < 5β1
15
Technology Investment and Alternative Regulatory Regimes with Demand Uncertainty
These are the optimal investment timings chosen by the incumbent as long as the
conditions ((25(a − c)2 + 9(10β1(a − c) + (3β1 − 2β2)
2 + 4β1β2))γ)/(180φ) ≤ 1, ((3β
2
1 +
2(a− c)(β1 + 2β2))γ)/(12φ) ≤ 1 and ((4β1(a− c+ β1))γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are satisﬁed.
Here we ﬁnd that, when the OLO participates into the NGN market, investment timing
is positively correlated with its ability to provide value-added services, d
dβ2
ΔP∗ > 0. Since
the incumbent seeks to capture some rent from the OLO, the higher the OLO’s ability is,
the earlier the incumbent invests hoping to earn from access rents in the upstream market,
in case of successful investment. This eﬀect is stronger, the higher is the probability of
success, d
2
dβ2dγ
ΔP∗ > 0. Also, unsurprisingly, the investment is made earlier in time the
higher the probabilty of success, d
dγ
ΔP∗ > 0.
The socially optimal investment timing
As a benchmark for comparison, we now evaluate the socially optimal investment
timing. The social welfare function can be written as:
E(WP ) = (1−Δ)WC +ΔE(WNP )
where E(WNP ) is the post-investment expected welfare with partial regulation - the su-
perscript N stands for NGN -, and it is given by:
E(WNP ) =γ
(
(qPs∗1 + q
Ps∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qPs∗1 )
2 + rPs∗qPs∗2 − (Δ)φ/2 + (q
Ps∗
2 )
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
(qPf∗1 + q
Pf∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qPf∗1 )
2 − (Δ)φ/2 + (qPf∗2 )
2
)
The ﬁrst term inside the brackets represents the consumer surplus, the last term is the
OLO’s proﬁt and the remaining ones are the proﬁt earned by the incumbent. Now we put
all equilibrium solutions into E(WP ) and the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ΔP∗
yields the following results in the diﬀerent cases:
ΔPW∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(−5(a−c)2)γ
72φ +
(76(β2−β1)2+β1(55β1+20β2)+(130β1+20β2)(a−c))γ
200φ if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
(9β21+4(a−c)(3β1+2β2))γ
24φ if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
(11(β1−β2)2+8(a−c)(β1+β2)+8β1β2)γ
18φ if 6β2 < 5β1
The superscript W stands for the welfare maximising result. This solution will repre-
sent the socially optimal investment timings as long as the conditions ((−5(a− c)2/72φ)+
(76(β2 − β1)
2 + β1(55β1 + 20β2) + (130β1 + 20β2)(a − c))γ/(200φ)) ≤ 1, (9β
2
1 + 4(a −
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c)(3β1 + 2β2))γ)/(48φ) ≤ 1 and ((11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 8β1β2)γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1
are satisﬁed.
2.2.1 Extension: Compulsory switch to NGN
In this extension we show what happens to the incumbent’s access price decisions when
there is compulsory switch to the NGN once the investment is deployed10. In this case,
the OLO’s outside option would be zero, as in Foros (2004). When the OLO’s alternative
is leaving the market entirely, the only circumstance under which the OLO makes positive
proﬁts in the NGN is when it has more ability than the incumbent. When β2 < β1, indeed,
the incumbent is indiﬀerent between charging an access price that extracts OLO’s proﬁts
entirely, or one that excludes the OLO from the NGN market tout court.
Stage 2
Equilibrium quantities in stage 2 are unchanged.
The ex-post participation conditions are diﬀerent, since the copper network option is
not available anymore once the NGN investment is deployed. The outside option scenario
consists in the OLO exiting the market and the incumbent being monopolist:
πos1 =
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
, πos2 = 0
πof1 =
(
a− c
2
)2
, πof2 = 0
The ex-post OLO’s participation conditions are the following:
• in case of success (
a− c− 2rls + 2β2 − β1
3
)2
≥ 0
• in case of failure (
a− c− 2rlf
3
)2
≥ 0
10Consider that, at present, mandatory switch of the legacy network is not included in the EU
regulatory framework.
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The above conditions require that:
rls ≤
a− c+ 2β2 − β1
2
rlf ≤
a− c
2
with l = P,F,RS.
Stage 1: the incumbent chooses the access price to the NGN
The incumbent’s proﬁt function after investment is unchanged:
E(πP1 ) = γ((q
Ps∗
1 )
2 + rPsqPs∗2 ) + (1− γ)(q
Pf∗
1 )
2 −Δφ/2
The expected access price chosen by the ﬁrm is the following:
rP∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
a−c
2 +
β1+4β2
10 in case of success
a−c
2 in case of failure
The corresponding expected equilibrium quantities are the following:⎧⎨
⎩
E(qP∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c
2 +
7β1−2β2
10
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
2
)
E(qP∗2 ) = γ
(
2(β2−β1)
5
)
As we can see, the incumbent always has positive quantities, but the OLO has non
negative quantities only if β2 > β1: with this access price level, whenever the OLO is not
at least as good as the incumbent in oﬀering value-added services, it will be excluded from
the market. Alternatively, the incumbent can charge the constrained access price that
veriﬁes the OLO’s ex-post access condition with equality.
In the following we prove that, when β2 ≤ β1, the incumbent is indiﬀerent between
charging the unconstrained access price that excludes the OLO and charging the con-
strained access price that veriﬁes the OLO’s ex-post participation constraints with equal-
ity, rPconst∗, which is:
rPconst∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
a−c+2β2−β1
2 in case of success
a−c
2 in case of failure
The constrained access price level above yields the following expected equilibrium
quantities: ⎧⎨
⎩E(q
P∗
1 ) = γ
(
a−c+β1
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
2
)
E(qP∗2 ) = 0
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Therefore, the incumbent’s proﬁts from exclusion, πo1 = γπ
os
1 + (1 − γ)π
of
1 , or from
market sharing with the constrained access price, πPs1 [rP=rPconst∗], are the same:
πo1 =γ
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c
2
)2
πPs1 [rP=rPconst∗] =γ
(
a− c+ β1
2
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c
2
)2
When the OLO’s outside option is exiting the market entirely, if we assume that when
indiﬀerent the incumbent favors market sharing, there is no case for exclusion with partial
regulation.
The access conditions though are less favorable to the OLO. Whenever the OLO is not
at least as good as the incumbent in oﬀering value-added services, its proﬁts are driven
down to zero. In our basic model instead, we ﬁnd that there is a case in which the OLO
is worse than the incumbent but it earns positive proﬁts and remains active in the market
with partial regulation.
2.3 Full Regulation
We consider this case as a benchmark for cost-based regulation, where the regulator chooses
the access charge by maximising a standard welfare function. In our case, cost-based
regulation translates in marginal cost pricing, so the regulator only ensures to cover the
incumbent’s operating costs.
Stage 1: the regulator sets the access price to the NGN
In this case, the regulator sets the access rule to the NGN in order to maximise social
welfare. Its objective function after investment is the following:
E(WNF ) =γ
(
(qFs∗1 + q
Fs∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFs∗1 )
2 + rFsqFs∗2 −Δφ/2 + (q
Fs∗
2 )
2
)
(1− γ)
(
(qFf∗1 + q
Ff∗
2 )
2
2
+ (qFf∗1 )
2 −Δφ/2 + (qFf∗2 )
2
)
We remind that rFf = 0 by Condition 2.411. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
11In case of failure, the regulated access charge is set to the marginal cost level to prompt the
OLO’s use of NGN anyways. In this case, from a policy point of view, it is more suitable and
less distorsive to use other instruments rather than the access charge to help covering investment’s
costs, i.e. public subsidies.
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rFs gives the access price as:
rFs∗ = c− a+ 4β1 − 5β2
c − a < 0 is a necessary condition for a broadband market to exist. If β1 > β2 so
much that 4β1 − 5β2 > a − c, then the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition given by the
expression above is positive, rFs∗ > 0, implying that the regulator set an above cost access
charge12.
If, otherwise, the incumbent is worse than the OLO in oﬀering value-added services,
β1 ≤ β2, or if it is better in oﬀering value-added services but not by a great extent, β1 > β2
but 4β1−5β2 < a−c, the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition is lower than the incumbent’s
marginal cost of network operations, i.e. rFs∗ < 0. The regulator, indeed, not only values
the fact that the OLO is able to increase demand through β2, as also the incumbent does
through β1, but it also values that the OLO’s presence increases competition downstream.
This is the reason why, in order to encourage the OLO’s participation into the NGN
market, the regulator may set a below-cost access charge. However, rFs∗ < 0 contradicts
Assumption 2.1, according to which rFs∗ ≥ 0, so in this case we will impose rFs∗ = 0,
such that optimal regulated access price will be set equal to the marginal cost.
The access price in case of full regulation is as following:
rF∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩0 if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− cc− a+ 4β1 − 5β2 otherwise
By substituting the values for rF∗ into the expressions for the equilibrium quantities,
we obtain the following expected quantities:
E(qF∗1 ) =
⎧⎨
⎩γ
(
a−c+2β1−β2
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
γ2(β1 − β2) + (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
otherwise
12In an unreported document, available from authors upon request, we analyse the case where
the regulator chooses a single access charge independent of demand, rˆ. The socially optimal access
charge becomes equal to c− a+ γˆ(4β1 − 5β2), where γˆ is the perceived probability of success. We
can observe that the solution remains exactly the same as in the basic model, unless β1 is so high
that rˆ becomes positive. In those cases, we observe that the range of parameters for which the
regulated access price is positive shrinks, meaning that the chance for the incumbent to be awarded
of its higher ability in oﬀering services is lower. Moreover, the main diﬀerence to our basic model
is that, in case of failure, the OLO would be forced out of the NGN market, due to an above cost
access price, switching back to the legacy network. Finally, in case of success, the access charge rˆ
would be lower than in our basic model, depriving the incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGN.
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E(qF∗2 ) =
⎧⎨
⎩γ
(
a−c+2β2−β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
γ(a− c+ 4β2 − 3β1) + (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
otherwise
OLO’s ability β2
0 g
4β1
5
− a−c
5
3β1
4
− a−c
6
if β1 >
2(a−c)
3
Exclusion operated
by the regulator
rF∗ = 4β1 − 5β2 − a+ c
rF∗ = 0
Figure 2: Full Regulation
From the above equations we can see that: when 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a − c, the expected
equilibrium quantities are positive, given a− c > 0 and Assumption 2.2; when 4β1−5β2 >
a− c, on one side, the incumbent’s expected quantity is unambiguously positive - because
a− c > 0 and β1 > β2 in this case -, and on the other side, the positive sign for the OLO’s
quantity is guaranteed by Condition 2.513.
Notice that Condition 2.5 here implies that the regulator sets access conditions in
such a way not to exclude the OLO from the market, when the OLO has a lower ability in
oﬀering value-added services with respect to the incumbent, although it is equally eﬃcient
on the cost side. This case appears to be more realistic and in line with the institutional
framework in Europe 14.
Simple algebra identiﬁes the range for β2 where it is possible to have a positive reg-
ulated access price together with the OLO active in the NGN market. Such range of
parameters is:
3β1/4− (a− c)/6 ≤ β2 < 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
where the right hand side corresponds to the condition for an above cost access price,
while the left hand side corresponds to the condition for non exclusion of the OLO. This
13Recall that Condition 2.5 ensures the ex-post convenience for the OLO to use NGN in any
state of demand.
14The European Commission (2002, page 117−119), indeed, has adopted the standard of Equally
Eﬃcient Operator (EEO) in the context of access regulation and price test. Besides that, demand
factors are less observable and much more volatile, so we would not expect the regulator to base
its decisions on access price on demand factors so heavily as to exclude an EEO from the market,
most of all in a situation where uncertainty plays a central role.
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range of parameters exists only if β1 > 2(a − c)/3. For all β1 ≤ 2(a− c)/3, the threshold
value for β2 to have non exclusion and positive access price is higher than the threshold
necessary to have a positive regulated access price in the ﬁrst place, as shown in Figure 2.
Intuitively, as long as the OLO’s ability is higher than the incumbent’s one, the regula-
tor favours the OLO’s participation into the market through a low access price, i.e. setting
the access charge equal to the marginal cost. The regulator starts setting an above cost
access charge when the incumbent’s ability becomes considerably higher than the OLO’s
one15. In this case the OLO remains active in the market as long as its ability is above
some minimum threshold, 3β1/4− (a− c)/6 ≤ β2.
Stage 0: the incumbent chooses the investment timing
The incumbent will have diﬀerent objective functions depending on the parameters.
In particular, when 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a − c we have that r
F∗ = 0. Therefore the incumbent
makes no proﬁt in the upstream market and its objective function is:
max
ΔF
E(πF1 ) = (1−Δ
F )
(
a− c
3
)2
+
ΔF
(
γ
(
a− c+ 2β1 − β2
3
)2
+ (1− γ)
(
a− c
3
)2)
− (ΔF )2φ/2
When 4β1−5β2 > a−c, we have that r
F∗ > 0, then the incumbent’s objective function
is:
max
ΔF
E(πF1 ) =(1−Δ
F )
(
a− c
3
)2
+
ΔF
(
γ(2(β1 − β2)
2 + (c− a+ 4β1 − 5β2)(a− c+ 4β2 − 3β1))+
(1− γ)
(
a− c
3
)2)
− (ΔF )2φ/2
The two ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to investment timing ΔF give the following
solution:
ΔF∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
(2(a−c)(2β1−β2)+(2β1−β2)2)γ
9φ if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
(−72(β1−β2)2+9(7β1−9β2)(a−c)+9β2(7β1−8β2)−10(a−c)2)γ
9φ otherwise
15This result is in line with Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) that also ﬁnd that when the degree of
spillover is small, i.e. that the OLO has a lower ability to oﬀer value-added services, the incumbent
has the incentive to overinvest in order to obtain from the regulator an above cost access charge
22
Carlo Cambini and Virginia Silvestri
This is the incumbent optimal investment timing as long as the conditions ((2(a −
c)(2β1 − β2) + (2β1 − β2)
2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 and ((−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a − c) +
9β2(7β2 − 8β2)− 10(a− c)
2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1 are satisﬁed.
In line with Foros (2004), here we ﬁnd that the optimal investment timing chosen
by the incumbent is negatively correlated with the OLO’s ability to provide value-added
services, i.e. d
dβ2
ΔF∗ < 0. When the regulated access price is set equal to the marginal
cost, the incumbent has no proﬁt by leasing lines to the OLO in the upstream market.
Therefore the incumbent’s investment is a pure spillover, increasing with the ability the
OLO has to exploit the new technology. When the regulated access price is positive, the
investment decreases with the OLO’s ability. So in both cases, the better is the OLO, the
later the incumbent tends to invest.
When the probability of success increases, the incumbent’s incentive to invest in NGN
decreases less rapidly with the OLO’s ability, d
2
dβ2dγ
ΔF∗ < 0, but also the investment
is made earlier d
dγ
ΔF∗ > 0. This happens because, other things being equal, a higher
probability of success gives the incumbent overall higher incentives to invest. Therefore,
even if regulated access conditions are such that an increase in the OLO’s ability determines
a decrease in the incumbent’s investment incentive, this eﬀect becomes less strong if the
probability of success is higher.
The socially optimal investment timing
If we substitute all equilibrium solutions into the welfare function, the ﬁrst-order con-
dition with respect to ΔFW gives the following result:
ΔFW∗ =
⎧⎨
⎩
(8(a−c)(β1+β2)+11(β2−β1)2+8β1β2)γ
18φ if 4β1 − 5β2 < a− c
((a−c)2+9(2β2−β1)2+18β1(β1−β2)+18β2(a−c))γ
18φ otherwise
This solution will be the socially optimal investment timing as long as the conditions
(8(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 11(β2 − β1)
2 + 8β1β2)γ/(18φ) ≤ 1 and (((a − c)
2 + 9(2β2 − β1)
2 +
18β1(β1 − β2) + 18β2(a− c))γ)/(18φ) ≤ 1 are satisﬁed.
2.4 Risk Sharing
We model the risk sharing agreement as an exogenous alternative, to highlight its potential
improvements over social welfare outcomes. More speciﬁcally, following Nitsche and Wi-
ethaus (2011), the risk sharing option is treated in a reduced form in which parties share
the ﬁxed cost of investment through some agreement and then they can use the NGN
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network without further side-payments. In this respect, risk sharing may be thought as a
compulsory regime imposed on ﬁrms by the regulator.16
In this setting we do not have the choice of access price, because ﬁrms ﬁrst compete
on services using the copper network and then use the commonly built NGN, without
further side-payments for the network usage. Therefore we can directly analyse the choice
of investment timing.
Stage 0: Joint choice of investment timing
The expected equilibrium quantities in the last stage of the risk sharing game write as
below: ⎧⎨
⎩
E(qRS∗1 ) = γ
(
a−c+2β1−β2
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
E(qRS∗2 ) = γ
(
a−c+2β2−β1
3
)
+ (1− γ)
(
a−c
3
)
Assumption 2.2 ensures that both ﬁrms are active in the market, in every state of
demand.
The two ﬁrms choose the investment timing by maximising over the sum of their
expected proﬁts, E(πRS12 ), considering the equilibrium quantities in the retail market:
max
ΔRS
E(πRS12 ) =(1−Δ
RS)
2(a − c)2
9
+
ΔRS
(
γ
(
(a− c+ 2β1 − β2)
2
9
+
(a− c+ 2β2 − β1)
2
9
)
+
(1− γ)
2(a − c)2
9
)
− (ΔRS)2φ/2
Their choice yields the following timing for the investment in NGN:
ΔRS∗ =
(2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2β1β2)γ
9φ
ΔRS∗ is the optimal timing of investment when incumbent and OLO enter in a coop-
eration agreement for the construction of the NGN infrastructure only if ((2(a − c)(β1 +
16We do not address in this paper the issue of the risk sharing contracts. Speciﬁcally on this
point, Inderst and Peitz (2012) analyse cost-sharing agreements between an incumbent ﬁrm and
an entrant, in the form of long-term contracts concluded before the investment is made, as opposed
to contracting taking place after the network has been constructed. The authors show that the
former type of agreement reduces the duplication of investment and may lead to more areas being
covered. Coordination at the investment level may come at a price, though, which is reduced
competition in the areas thus covered.
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β2) + 5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2β1β2)γ)/(9φ) ≤ 1. The second-order condition is always satisﬁed.
Notice that the optimal ΔRS∗ would be zero if there were no expected demand increase
following the investment, i.e. β1 = β2 = 0. Of course, the two ﬁrms would have no interest
in investing in NGN technology if they believed there would be no market for value-added
services.
Furthermore, it is interesting to analyse how such choice changes with the diﬀerence in
the ability to oﬀer value-added services and therefore with the returns from the investment.
Comparative statics shows that the sign of d
dβi
ΔRS∗ depends on the term 5βi−4βj+a−c,
with i, j = 1, 2 and i = j. Keeping β1 ﬁxed, an increase in the value of β2 unambigu-
ously yields to anticipating the joint construction of the NGN, i.e. d
dβ2
ΔRS∗ > 0, when
5β2−4β1+a−c ≥ 0, therefore, only when the OLO is better than the incumbent, or when
the incumbent is better than the OLO but not too much. When 5β2−4β1+a− c < 0, the
incumbent is considerably better than the OLO in oﬀering value-added services and an
increase in the ability of the OLO delays the construction of the NGN, i.e. d
dβ2
ΔRS∗ < 0.
This eﬀect reﬂects the fact that, with risk sharing, the two ﬁrms internalise the proﬁt
externalities generated by Cournot competition. Notice, indeed, that we encountered the
same conditions for the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition in case of full regulation:
rF∗ = 0 if 5β2 − 4β1 + a− c ≥ 0 and r
F∗ > 0 if 5β2 − 4β1 + a− c < 0.
The socially optimal investment timing
The socially optimal investment timing in case of risk sharing, obtained by inserting
equilibrium quantities into the welfare function and maximising with respect to ΔRSW ,
writes as below:
ΔRSW∗ =
(8(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1β2)γ
18φ
The equation above represents the socially optimal investment timing in case of risk
sharing as long as ((8(a − c)(β1 + β2) + 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1β2)γ)/18φ) ≤ 1.
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2.5 Comparison of results under partial regulation,
full regulation and risk sharing
We can derive the ﬁrst insight from this model by comparing the results obtained in case
of partial access regulation, full access regulation and risk sharing.
Proposition 2.2. For a given timing of investment Δ and under the assumptions rF ≥ 0
and 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i = j), expected industry output E(Q
l(Δ)) satisﬁes
E(QRS(Δ)) >E(QP (Δ))
E(QRS(Δ)) ≥E(QF (Δ))
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In line with Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), risk sharing is expected to induce more
competition than partial regulation and full regulation regimes. The ﬁrst inequality
E(QRS(Δ)) > E(QP (Δ)) arises because risk sharing involves no wholesale transfers and a
more symmetric market structure17, whereas partial regulation implies transfer from the
OLO to the incumbent and an asymmetric market structure, which reﬂects the lower level
of competition. The second inequality E(QRS(Δ)) ≥ E(QF (Δ)) arises because, when
the regulated access price is constrained to zero by Assumption 2.1, risk sharing and full
regulation yield the same outcome in terms of expected total quantities, but when the reg-
ulated access price is positive, full regulation involves a positive transfer which is higher
than marginal cost of production, so the overall market eﬃciency is higher under risk
sharing.
The equilibrium results in terms of NGN access conditions and, consequentially, invest-
ment incentives, change depending on the relative and absolute value of ﬁrms’ abilities.
In Table 1, we combine the various modes of regulation’s equilibrium outcomes, identi-
fying ﬁve diﬀerent relevant parameters ranges. For ease of exposition, we name them as
following: P1F1RS, P2F1RS, P3F1RS, P3F2RS, P3F3RS.
Case P1F1RS describes the situation in which the OLO has considerably more ability
than the incumbent in oﬀering value-added services through the NGN. In this case, when
the access price is not regulated, the incumbent chooses the monopoly price, whereas the
regulator would choose a negative access price that we constrained to zero by Assumption
2.1. In the second case, P2F1RS, the values of the two ﬁrms’ abilities are close to
17The possible diﬀerence in market shares reﬂects only the diﬀerences in abilities, not diﬀerences
in market power. If the two ﬁrms are equal in abilities, market structure is symmetric under risk
sharing.
26
Carlo Cambini and Virginia Silvestri
each other, either favoring the incumbent or the OLO. Here, with partial regulation, the
incumbent chooses to charge a constrained access price that makes it indiﬀerent for the
OLO to use the NGN or switch back to the copper network, while the full regulation
outcome is unchanged compared to the previous situation. As the OLO’s ability decreases
with respect to the incumbent’s one, the incumbent ﬁnds it more and more convenient to
exclude the OLO from the NGN network and provide value-added services alone. Therefore
in the range of values P3F1RS, we obtain exclusion with partial regulation, while the
access price is zero with full regulation. When the incumbent becomes considerably better
than the OLO in boosting the demand, the regulator favors its activity by imposing a
positive regulated access price, but only insofar as that does not exclude the OLO from
the market - case P3F2RS. A positive regulated access price together with non exclusion
is not possible if the diﬀerence between the two ﬁrms’ abilities is important but their
absolute values are low. In that case, the OLO would prefer to use the regulated copper
network if asked to pay for the NGN, as in case P3F3RS where we have double exclusion,
with full regulation and with partial regulation. We do not look into this case, as explained
in section 2.3.
Parameters Range Partial Regulation Full Regulation Risk Sharing
g > β2 ≥ β1 +
5(a−c)
6
P1F1RS
P1: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO in the NGN market
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
β1 +
5(a−c)
6 > β2 ≥
5β1
6
P2F1RS
P2: E(rP∗) constrained, OLO
in the NGN market
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
5β1
6 > β2 ≥
4β1
5 −
a−c
5
P3F1RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F1: E(rF∗) = 0 RS: no upstream transfers
If β1 >
2(a−c)
3
4β1
5 −
a−c
5 > β2 ≥
3β1
4 −
a−c
6
P3F2RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F2: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO in the NGN market
RS: no upstream transfers
3β1
4 −
a−c
6 > β2 > 0
P3F3RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F3: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
RS: no upstream transfers
If β1 ≤
2(a−c)
3
4β1
5 −
a−c
5 > β2 > 0
P3F3RS
P3: E(rP∗) unconstrained,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
F3: E(rF∗) > 0,
OLO‘s EXCLUSION
RS: no upstream transfers
Table 1: Relevant Parameters Thresholds
Proposition 2.3. Under the assumptions rF ≥ 0, 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i = j), and
given the OLO’s participation constraints (2.3) and (2.5), the following results hold:
1. Both ﬁrms are active in the market no matter what is the mode of regulation, for
β2 ≥ 5β1/6
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OLO’s ability β2
0 gβ1 +
5(a−c)
6
β1 = β2
5β1
6
4β1
5
− a−c
5
3β1
4
− a−c
6
if β1 >
2(a−c)
3
P1F1RS
P2F1RS
P3F1RS
P3F2RS
P3F3RS
Figure 3: Relevant parameter thresholds
2. The OLO is excluded from the NGN market with partial regulation, for β2 < 5β1/6
3. The chosen investment timing is always later with full regulation and risk sharing
than with partial regulation: ΔF∗ < ΔP∗; ΔRS∗ < ΔP∗
4. The chosen investment timing is later with full regulation than with risk sharing when
regulated access price is zero, and ambiguous when it is positive: for β1 ≤ 2(a−c)/3,
ΔF∗ < ΔRS∗; ΔF∗  ΔRS∗, for β1 > 2(a− c)/3
5. The OLO’s ability to provide value-added services through the NGN aﬀects the timing
of investment. The eﬀect is: positive with partial regulation, d
dβ2
ΔP∗ > 0; negative
with full regulation, d
dβ2
ΔF∗ < 0; with risk sharing, this eﬀect changes from positive
to negative as β2’s absolute value decreases with respect to β1, or vice versa.
6. The chosen investment timing is always later than the socially optimal one, with
partial regulation, full regulation, and risk sharing: ΔP∗ < ΔPW∗; ΔF∗ < ΔFW∗;
and ΔRS∗ < ΔRSW∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The OLO always beneﬁts from a spillover eﬀect from the construction of NGN done
by the incumbent. Nevertheless, the incumbent can potentially capture some rent by
leasing its infrastructure to the rival. Under full access price regulation though, when the
OLO has more ability than the incumbent, the rent is set just equal to marginal cost by
the regulator, so the incumbent earns nothing from the upstream market. In this case,
its investment incentive is dampened since it cannot extract any beneﬁt from the OLO’s
value-added services. Therefore, it chooses to invest later with respect to the case when
the NGN is unregulated. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding in the literature that access price
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regulation plays a disincentive role in the incumbent’s investment decision (Kotakorpi
(2006)). It is important to stress here that, although the ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts in
this model in case of full regulation with marginal cost pricing, because of the Cournot
competition assumption, the same result is found in a setting with Hotelling competition
by Kotakorpi (2006). Less uncertainty mitigates such eﬀect: when the investment success
becomes more likely, the speed at which the incumbent delays its investment plans when
β2 is higher decreases,
d2
dβ2dγ
ΔF∗ < 0.
When β1 > 2(a − c)/3, there is a range of parameters, 3β1/4 − (a − c)/6 ≤ β2 <
4β1/5− (a− c)/5, for which the regulated access price is positive, the OLO is active in the
NGN market with full regulation, but it is excluded with partial regulation. In this case,
partial regulation gives the highest investment incentives, but the relationship between
full regulation and risk sharing gives ambiguous results in terms of investment timing.
2.6 Welfare analysis
The previous analysis revealed that risk sharing induces the highest expected level of com-
petition downstream for a given timing of investment, in line with Nitsche and Wiethaus
(2011), while partial regulation gives the strongest investment incentives. In this section,
we provide a comprehensive welfare ranking of the diﬀerent modes of regulation, broken
down according to the range of parameter values shown in Figure 3. In the Appendix A.1.4
we report a detailed overview of the results. From these results, we derive the following
statement.
Proposition 2.4. Under the assumptions rF ≥ 0, 2βi ≥ βj (i, j = 1, 2 with i = j), and
given the OLO’s participation constraints (2.3) and (2.5), the following results hold:
1. Expected consumer welfare is higher under risk sharing compared to partial regula-
tion;
2. When the OLO is better than the incumbent in oﬀering value-added services, expected
total welfare is higher under risk sharing compared to partial regulation ;
3. When the OLO is better than the incumbent in oﬀering value-added services or
when the incumbent is better than the OLO by a great extent, expected consumer
welfare and expected total welfare are higher under partial regulation compared to full
regulation.Otherwise, the diﬀerence in total welfare and consumer welfare between
partial and full regulation remains ambiguous.
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4. When the access price to NGN is regulated at cost, expected consumer welfare and
expected total welfare are higher under risk sharing compared to full regulation;
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Once taken into account the equilibrium choice of investment timing, we ﬁnd that risk
sharing yields a higher expected consumer surplus than full regulation. When the regulated
access price is zero, risk sharing also unambiguously yields a higher overall welfare than
full regulation. However, when comparing partial regulation and risk sharing, investment
incentives and intensity of competition go in opposite directions, therefore the results in
terms of expected consumer welfare and expected total welfare change depending on the
diﬀerent parameter values.
When the OLO is better in oﬀering value-added services, with partial regulation the
incumbent always charges an access price that ensures the OLO‘s participation to the
NGN, while with full regulation the access price is set to marginal cost, i.e. cases P1F1RS
and P2F1RS with β2 ≥ β1. Under these circumstances, risk sharing is unambiguously
dominant, both from a total welfare and a consumer welfare viewpoint. Even though
compared to partial regulation, risk sharing investment‘s incentives are lower, retail market
higher competitive intensity more than compensates for the delay in NGN construction.
When the incumbent has more ability than the OLO, welfare analysis becomes less
clearcut. In the range of parameters for which the incumbent charges a constrained access
fee and both ﬁrms are active in the NGN market, i.e. P2F2RS with β2 < β1, we ﬁnd that
full regulation still yields the least desirable outcome, but the relationship between partial
regulation and risk sharing is ambiguous both from a consumer welfare and a total welfare
viewpoint. The reason is that the trade-oﬀ between stronger investment‘s incentives under
partial regulation and higher competitive intensity under risk sharing is less stark when
the incumbent charges the access fee that makes the OLO indiﬀerent between staying in
the NGN or switching back to the regulated copper network. For this reason, indeed,
depending on the parameters, total welfare can be higher or lower under risk sharing or
partial regulation.
Finally, we analyse two cases in which the incumbent ﬁnds it more convenient to
exclude the OLO from the NGN market because its own ability is considerably higher
than the OLO’s ability. In this case, the OLO oﬀers broadband services through the
copper network, earning positive proﬁts thanks to the regulated access price. Under
this circumstance, when the incumbent’s ability is not too high, i.e. β1 ≤ 2(a − c)/3,
there is exclusion with partial regulation and a zero access charge with full regulation, i.e.
P3F1RS. Risk sharing is still unambiguously better than full regulation, both from a total
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welfare and a consumer welfare perspective. The relationship between partial regulation
and risk sharing, though, is again ambiguous as of the total welfare outcome.
Under conditions for which there is exclusion with partial regulation, if the incumbent’s
ability is high enough, i.e. β1 > 2(a − c)/3, there exists a range of parameters such that
the regulator sets an above cost NGN access price and the OLO stays in the NGN market
nonetheless, i.e. P3F2RS. In this case, partial regulation investment incentives are so
high that total welfare turns out to be the highest compared to risk sharing and full
regulation. The relationship between risk sharing and full regulation as of total welfare is
ambiguous: investment’s incentives can be higher or lower depending on parameters, but
consumer welfare is always higher with risk sharing.
3 Summary and conclusion
In this paper we dynamically model the competition between a vertically-integrated in-
cumbent ﬁrm and a facilities-free OLO in the broadband market, where the former has
the option to invest in building a NGN that allows ﬁrms to drastically increase the quality
and variety of their services. Market success of the NGN in terms of demand increase
is uncertain. Diﬀerent from other studies that assume demand uncertainty, the choice of
investment with demand uncertainty here is analysed in a dynamic setting with diﬀeren-
tiated ﬁrms. The analysis is conducted under three diﬀerent possible modes of regulation:
partial regulation (the NGN is unregulated), full regulation (the NGN is regulated) and
risk sharing (there are no side payments between the ﬁrms for the use of the NGN).
Our analysis reveals that the investment is always undertaken later than the social
optimum timing in all modes of regulation. The investment choice is aﬀected by the
OLO’s ability to oﬀer value-added services. Such eﬀect is positive with partial regulation
and negative with full regulation, while with risk sharing the eﬀect is changing from
positive for high values of β2, to negative as β1 gets considerably bigger than β2, and
vice versa. Partial regulation always yields the earliest investment compared to the other
regulatory regimes, while risk sharing ensures the highest level of competition intensity.
Welfare outcomes reveal that risk sharing is the dominant regime in a consumer sur-
plus perspective. Expected consumer surplus is always higher under risk sharing than
under partial regulation, but also under full regulation for a large set of parameters. In
particular, when both ﬁrms are active, full regulation’s consumer surplus outcome is the
least preferable; only when the incumbent’s ability is so high that regulated access price
to NGN is larger than the marginal cost, the comparison of consumer surplus between full
regulation and risk sharing becomes ambiguous.
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Furthermore, when the OLO’s ability is higher, risk sharing is the dominant regime
also from a total welfare perspective. When the incumbent’s ability is higher, welfare
comparisons between the three regulatory regimes become less clearcut.
Our analysis sheds some conceptual light on the debate about what is the preferable
access regulation regime to prompt telecommunications network development, ensuring
that the beneﬁts of it will be enjoyed by ﬁnal consumers eventually. The diﬀerence in ﬁrms’
ability to provide value-added services is important in the context. It exerts inﬂuence on
the investment choice and on the previous access pricing decisions, which in turn aﬀect
market competition and social welfare. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that demand uncertainty
requires a careful formulation of access regulation rules. A robust set of rules should
take into account the potential for an investment failure and provide reasonable access
conditions for the ﬁrms involved in all cases. Also, uncertainty plays the role of delaying
the investment decision in all regimes. According to our analysis, risk sharing can be
particularly beneﬁcial for consumers and give fairly high investment incentives at the
same time. At this stage, it would be interesting to go further in the research to study
how risk sharing agreement can be robust to the inclusion of late entrants, to avoid that
the construction of NGN could possibly become a new source of market power and thereof
be unable to deploy all of its beneﬁts. Moreover, it would be interesting to make the choice
to engage in a risk sharing agreement endogenous. We leave these questions for future
research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Propositions
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
When 2(β2−β1)/5 < (a−c)/3, partial regulation unconstrained access price gives the OLO
less proﬁts than the outside option. The access price that veriﬁes the OLO’s participation
constraint 2.5 with equality is:
a− c+ rPs + 2β2 − β1
3
=
a− c
3
rPs =
2β2 − β1
2
The incumbent will prefer to charge the access price above rather than charge the
unconstrained access price and exclude the OLO as long as the outside option proﬁts -
being the only provider of valued added services through NGN - are not higher than the
market sharing proﬁts:
πPs
1[rPs∗=
(2β2−β1)
2
]
≥ πo1(
a− c
3
+
β1
2
)2
+
(2β2 − β1)
2
(a− c)
3
≥
(
a− c
3
+
2β1
3
)2
The above inequality is unambiguously satisﬁed only for values of β’s such that the
incumbent‘s advantage in ability to oﬀer value-added services is not too large:
6β2 ≥ 5β1
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Total expected quantities for a given investment timing, under the diﬀerent modes of
regulation are the following:
• Partial regulation⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
E(QP ) = (1−ΔP )a−c3 +Δ
P
(
2(a−c)
3 +
(
3β1+2β2
10 −
a−c
6 )γ
))
if 2(β2 − β1)/5 ≥ (a− c)/3
E(QP ) = (1−ΔP )a−c3 +Δ
P
(
2(a−c)
3 +
β1γ
2
)
if 6β2 ≥ 5β1
E(QP ) = (1−ΔP )a−c3 +Δ
P
(
2(a−c)
3 +
β1γ
3
)
if 6β2 < 5β1
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• Full regulation⎧⎨
⎩
E(QF ) = (1−ΔF )a−c3 +Δ
F
(
2(a−c)
3 +
(β1+β2)γ
3
)
if 4β1 − 5β2 ≤ a− c
E(QF ) = (1−ΔF )a−c3 +Δ
F
(
(2β2 − β1)γ +
(a−c)(2+γ)
3
)
otherwise
• Risk sharing
E(QRS) = (1−ΔRS)
a− c
3
+ ΔRS
(
2(a− c)
3
+
(β1 + β2)γ
3
)
We now compare partial regulation and full regulation with risk sharing, considering
the speciﬁc conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as deﬁned in Table 1, and
Assumption 2.2:
• if P1RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
10(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)
20(a − c) + (3(3β1 + 2β2)− 5(a− c))γ
10(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)− (20(a − c) + (3(3β1 + 2β2)− 5(a− c))γ) = (β2 −
β1
2
)γ > 0
• if P2RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)
4(a − c) + 3β1γ
2(2(a − c) + (β1 + β2)γ)− (4(a − c) + 3β1γ) = (2β2 − β1)γ > 0
• if P3RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ
2(a− c) + β1γ
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ − (2(a− c) + β1γ) = β2γ > 0
• if F1RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
= 1
• if F2RS:
E(QRS)
E(QP )
=
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ
2(a− c) + (3(2β2 − β1) + (a− c))γ
2(a− c) + (β1 + β2)γ − (2(a− c) + (3(2β2 − β1) + (a− c))γ) = (4β1 − 5β2 − (a− c))γ > 0
Therefore, E(QRS) > E(QP ); and E(QRS) ≥ E(QF ).
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A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
(1) and (2) Proof of these statements derives directly from Proposition 2.1.
(3) Investment timing: partial regulation vs full regulation and risk sharing
In order to compare investment timings we do the following computations, considering
each time the speciﬁc conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as deﬁned in
Table 1, and Assumption 2.2:
• if P1F1
ΔP
ΔF
=
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2
20(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c)(2β1 − β2))
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2 − (20(2β1 − β2)(2(a− c)(2β1 − β2))) =
(5(a− c) + β1 + 4β2)
2 > 0
• if P2F1
ΔP
ΔF
=
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))
4(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2)
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))− (4(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2)) =
4(2β2 − β1)(10(a − c) + 7β1 − 2β2) > 0
• if P3F1
ΔP
ΔF
=
4(a− c+ β21
(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2)
4(a− c+ β21)− (2β1 − β2)(2(a − c) + 2β1 − β2) = β2(a− c+ 4β1 − β2) > 0
• if P3F2
ΔP
ΔF
=
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)
−72(β1 − β2)2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)2
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)− (−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)
2) =
10(a − c)2 + 76(β1 − β2)
2 + β2(−55β1 + 68β2) + (a− c)(−59β1 + 81β2) > 0
• if P1RS
ΔP
ΔRS
=
25(a− c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2
20(5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)
25(a − c)2 + 90β1(a− c) + 81β
2
1 − 72β1β2 + 36β
2
2 − (20(5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)) =
25(a − c)2 + 10(5β1 − 4β2)(a− c)− 4(5β1 − 4β2)
2 + 9β1(9β1 − 8β2) > 0
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• if P2RS
ΔP
ΔRS
=
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))
4(5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)
3(3β21 + 2(β1 + 2β2)(a− c))− (4(5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2)) =
(2β2 − β1)(2(a − c) + 11β1 − 10β2) > 0
• if P3RS
ΔP
ΔRS
=
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)
5(β1 − β2)2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
4β1(a− c+ β
2
1)− (5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2) =
− β21 + 2(a− c)(β1 − β2) + 8β1β2 − 5β
2
2 > 0
Therefore, ΔF∗ < ΔP∗; and ΔRS∗ < ΔP∗.
(4) Investment timing: risk sharing vs full regulation
In order to compare investment timings we do the following computations, considering
each time the speciﬁc conditions under each relevant parameter threshold, as deﬁned in
Table 1, and Assumption 2.2:
• if F1RS
ΔRS
ΔF
=
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
(2β1 − β2)(2(a − c)(2β1 − β2))
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2 − ((2β1 − β2)(2(a − c)(2β1 − β2))) =
2(2β2 − β1)(a− c) + (2β2 − β1)
2 > 0
• if F2RS
ΔRS
ΔF
=
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2
−72(β1 − β2)2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a − c)2
5(β1 − β2)
2 + 2(a− c)(β1 + β2) + 2β1β2−
(−72(β1 − β2)
2 + 9(7β1 − 8β2)β2 + 9(7β1 − 9β2)(a− c)− 10(a− c)
2) =
10(a− c)2 + (83β2 − 61β1)(a− c) + 77(β1 − β2)
2 + β2(72β2 − 61β1)  0
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Therefore, for β1 ≤ 2(a − c)/3, Δ
F∗ < ΔRS∗; for β1 > 2(a − c)/3 (only occasion in
which there is no exclusion with a positive regulated access price), ΔF∗  ΔRS∗ .
(5) Comparative statics
Our comparative statics results, considering the speciﬁc conditions under each relevant
parameter threshold, as deﬁned in Table 1, and Assumption 2.2, are shown below:
• if P1
δ(ΔP )
δ(β2)
=
2(β2 − β1)γ
5φ
> 0
• if P2
δ(ΔP )
δ(β2)
=
(a− c)γ
3φ
> 0
• if P3, the OLO is not in the NGN market.
• if F1
δ(ΔF )
δ(β2)
=
−(2(a− c+ 2β1 − β2)γ
9φ
< 0
• if F2
δ(ΔF )
δ(β2)
=
(−9(a − c) + 23β1 − 32β2)γ
phi
< 0
• RS
δ(ΔRS)
δ(β2)
=
2(a− c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
2(a − c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
> 0 if β2 > 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
2(a − c− 4β1 + 5β2)γ
9φ
≤ 0 if β2 ≤ 4β1/5− (a− c)/5
Therefore, d
dβ2
ΔP∗ > 0; d
dβ2
ΔF∗ < 0; and d
dβ2
ΔRS∗ changing as shown above.
(6) Comparison of equilibrium investment timing and socially optimal investment tim-
ing
The comparison of equilibrium investment timing and socially optimal investment timing
in the diﬀerent regulatory regimes give the following results, considering conditions for
each parameter range as deﬁned in Table 1 and all other assumptions:
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• if P1
ΔPW
ΔP
= −3((125(a−c)2)−30(3β1+2β2)(a−c)−15β1(β1+4β2)−108(β1−β2)
2) > 0
• if P2
ΔPW
ΔP
= −6β21 − 4(a− c)(β1 + 2β2) + (4(a − c)(3β1 + 2β2) + 9β
2
1) > 0
• if P3
ΔPW
ΔP
= 11(β1 − β2)
2 + 8β1(β2 − β1) + 8β2(a− c) > 0
• if F1
ΔFW
ΔF
= 3(β21 + 4β2(a− c) + β2(3β2 − 2β1)) > 0
• if F2
ΔFW
ΔF
= 21(a− c)2+(180β2−126β1)(a− c)+171(β1 −β2)
2+β2(153β2−126β1) > 0
• RS
ΔRSW
ΔRS
= (β1 + 2β2)(4(a − c) + β1 + 2β2) > 0
Therefore, ΔP∗ < ΔPW∗; ΔF∗ < ΔFW∗; and ΔRS∗ < ΔRSW∗.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Expected consumer welfare is deﬁned as:
E(CSl) =Δl∗(CSC) + (1−Δl∗)E(CSl)
=Δl∗
(
(QC∗)2
2
)
+ (1−Δl∗)
(
γ
(
(Qls∗)2
2
)
+ (1− γ)
(
(Qlf∗)2
2
))
with Ql = ql1 + q
l
2.
Expected total welfare is deﬁned as:
E(W l) = Δl∗
(
(QC∗)2
2
+ (qC∗1 )
2 + (qC∗2 )
2
)
+
(1−Δl∗)
(
γ
(
(Qls∗)2
2
+ (qls∗1 )
2 + rlsqls∗2 −Δ
l∗φ/2 + (qls∗2 )
2
)
+
(1− γ)
(
(Qlf∗)2
2
+ (qlf∗1 )
2 −Δl∗φ/2 + (qlf∗2 )
2
))
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Our analysis reveal the following ranking of expected total welfare and expected con-
sumer welfare, respectively. Notice that the results are broken down according to the
relevant parameter thresholds deﬁned in Table 118.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
E(WRS) > E(WP ) > E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P1/P2F1RS, with β2 ≥ β1
E(WRS)  E(WP ) > E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P2F1RS, with β2 < β1
E(WRS) > E(WF ) ; E(WRS)  E(WP ) ; E(WP )  E(WF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F1RS
E(WP ) > E(WRS)  E(WF )] if β2,β1 s.t. P3F2RS⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
E(CSRS) > E(CSP ) > E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P1/P2F1RS
E(CSRS) > E(CSP )  E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F1RS
E(CSRS) > E(CSP )  E(CSF ) if β2,β1 s.t. P3F2RS
We now proceed by analysing each single statement contained in Proposition 2.4.
(1) Consumer welfare: risk sharing vs partial regulation
In order to compare consumer welfare outcomes it is suﬃcient to compare total quantities.
So we check under each of the speciﬁc parameter thresholds, deﬁned in Table 1 and ﬁnd:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
QP
QRS
< 0 if P1RS
QP
QRS
< 0 if P2RS
QP
QRS
< 0 if P3RS
Therefore, E(CSRS) > E(CSP ).
(2) Total welfare: risk sharing vs partial regulation and (3) Total welfare and consumer
welfare: partial regulation vs full regulation
From the results above, we derive that, in all cases in which β2 ≥ β1, namely P1F1RS
and P2F1RS (only for the part in which β2 ≥ β1): W
RS > WP > WF . Furthermore,
when the incumbent is better than the OLO by a great extent and the regulated access
price is positive, case P3F2, we have: WP > WF .
(4) Total welfare and consumer welfare: risk sharing vs full regulation In order to
compare consumer welfare outcomes it is suﬃcient to compare total quantities. So we
check under each of the speciﬁc parameter thresholds, deﬁned in Table 1 and ﬁnd:⎧⎨
⎩
QF
QRS
< 0 if F1RS
QF
QRS
 0 if F2RS (happening without exclusion only if β1 > 2(a− c)/3)
18Since expressions are cumbersome, Detailed equations are available upon request.
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Therefore, E(CSRS) > E(CSF ) when the access price is regulated at cost, and the rela-
tionship is ambiguous when the access price is positive. Also, from the results above we
obtain that only in case F1: WRS > WF .
(5) Total welfare and consumer welfare: full regulation ranking From the results above,
we can conclude that, in all cases in which there is no exclusion of the OLO from the NGN
market, namely P1F1RS and P2F1RS: WRS > WF and WP > WF ; CSRS > CSF and
CSP > CSF .
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